Keith Jieren Thirumaran

The Unique Standard of Care for Doctors in Singapore – Part 1 of the HCK Series

The PDF version of this article can be found here.


 

the unique standard of care for doctors in singapore – part 1 of the hck series

 

Keith Jieren Thirumaran*

 

 

I.                    Introduction

 

In the practice of medicine, a doctor’s job can be divided into 3 components: diagnosis, treatment, and advice.[1] Traditionally, the legal test for determining the standard of care that a doctor was expected to meet to avoid liability in negligence was the doctor-centric Bolam-Bolitho test which focuses on the doctor’s perspectives. While this test originally applied to medical advice in the UK[2] and Singapore[3], the position in the UK has since been changed by the Supreme Court in Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [Montgomery][4] where a patient-centric approach similar to the Australian High Court’s approach in Rogers v Whitaker [Rogers][5] was taken. After considering these and other overseas cases[6], the Singapore Court of Appeal adopted a modified and unique test in the context of medical advice in the landmark decision of Hii Chii Kok v Ooi Peng Jin London Lucien [HCK][7].

In this two-part series of articles, the HCK test will be examined in detail with comparisons drawn with the tests of other jurisdictions. Part 1 of the HCK series begins by providing an overview of the HCK test followed by an analysis of various aspects of the test such as the balance that was struck in HCK, the seemingly additional test of relevancy, the types of information covered, the scenario where information is unknown, and the remaining ambiguities. Part 2 of the HCK series[8] will deal specifically with stage 3 of the HCK test relating to the situations where a doctor is justified in withholding information, otherwise known as the exceptions to a doctor’s duty of disclosure.

 

II.                 Overview of the Singapore Test

 

The HCK test formulated by the Singapore Court of Appeal is a three-stage test.

 

1.       First Stage

 

The first stage involves the patient’s identification of the information not provided and why it should be regarded as relevant and material.[9] The court held that a doctor must disclose information that would either “be relevant and material to a reasonable patient situated in the particular patient’s position”, or the doctor knows is important to the particular patient.[10]

The identification of the information not provided is necessary in order “to determine whether the doctor possessed that information at the material time” and therefore “whether the withholding of the information was justified”.[11] The underlying concern for this requirement “is to ensure that the scope of the dispute is clearly delineated” and that the process is fair to doctors.[12]

The court will take into account the personal circumstances of the patient to determine what “a reasonable person in the position of the patient in question would consider material”.[13] However, such information is only relevant “to the extent that the doctor knew or ought reasonably to have known of them.[14]

The materiality of the information is assessed from the patient’s perspective[15] and takes into account what the particular patient was “reasonably likely to have attached significance to” as well as what the doctor knew or should have known the particular patient would have attached significance to.[16] The analysis of relevancy and materiality of the information would be largely matters of “common sense” and would generally exclude “information that reasonable people would regard as immaterial or irrelevant”.[17] This analysis would also take into account information that is immaterial to the reasonable person in the patient’s position which the actual patient still found material for the patient’s own reasons, but would only require disclosure if “the doctor actually knew or had reason to believe that the particular information was relevant and material to the particular patient”.[18]

The court in HCK also went further than Montgomery[19] in terms of the types of information that could be considered material. The court held that it would not confine the information to material risks concerning the treatment and its alternatives[20] but would instead adopt the broad types of material information that were identified in the Canadian case of Dickson v Pinder[21]. These include: the doctor’s diagnosis of the patient’s condition, the prognosis of that condition with and without medical treatment, the nature of the proposed medical treatment, the risks associated with the proposed medical treatment, and alternatives to the proposed medical treatment as well as their advantages and risks.[22] The type of information reasonably material would depend on factors such as certainty, consequence, and context.[23]

 

 

 

2.       Second Stage

 

The second stage involves determining whether the doctor was in possession of the information identified as relevant and material.[24] Where the doctor was not in possession of the information, the case will no longer be assessed under the category of negligent advice, but instead be assessed as a negligent diagnosis or treatment case and therefore be subjected to the normal Bolam-Bolitho test.[25]

 

3.       Third Stage

 

The third stage involves an examination of the reasons why the doctor chose to withhold the information from the patient.[26] While an overview of the third stage is provided at this juncture, a detailed analysis of this stage can be found in Part 2 of the HCK series.[27]

The court would determine whether the “doctor was justified in withholding the information”.[28] However, whether the doctor was justified would not be measured by the Bolam-Bolitho test, even though it is informed by medical considerations.[29] After determining that the doctor’s reasons were justified, the court would then determine whether the doctor’s decision “was a sound judgment having regard to the standards of a reasonable and competent doctor”.[30] At this stage, expert medical evidence will have some significance because there is still “an element of professional judgment involved”.[31]

The court did not want to confine or restrict the situations that could be justifiable but held that courts would consider all the circumstances in determining whether the withholding of information was justified.[32] However, the court elaborated on 3 non-exhaustive categories of situations that would justify non-disclosure.[33]

The first situation allowing for the withholding of information is where the patient does not wish to know the information.[34] This is treated as a “factual question” on the existence and scope of a patient’s waiver of the information, and will not usually involve expert opinion.[35]

The second situation is where there is an emergency scenario, such as when there is a threat of death or serious harm to the patient, while the patient lacks decision-making capacity and there is no appropriate substitute decision-maker.[36] For this situation, the Bolam-Bolitho test will apply because medical expert opinion will be “crucial” in determining whether the urgency of the situation is such that seeking opportunities to provide information to the patient can be sacrificed.[37]

The third situation involves therapeutic privilege and applies where a doctor “reasonably believes that the very act of giving particular information would cause the patient serious physical or mental harm”.[38] For this situation, expert medical and psychological evidence will “be helpful or even crucial” to the court.[39] However, the Bolam-Bolitho test will not be applied because the focus is on whether the court is of the opinion that the patient would likely be harmed when informed of the material information.[40]

 

 

 

 

 

III.              ANALYSIS OF THE HCK TEST

 

It is clear that while the HCK test draws some inspiration from the Montgomery test, it also modifies and refines it in several aspects. This section will now explore the reasons and rationale for the approach taken in HCK as well as examine the unique aspects of the HCK test.

 

1.       The balance struck in HCK

 

In HCK, the court made a “carefully calibrated shift in the standard of care” that is required of doctors in the context of advice.[41] The result is that the new test in Singapore is a middle-ground between the patient-centric position in Montgomery as well as the doctor-centric position in Bolam-Bolitho. However, in relation to certain aspects that will be discussed below, the court in HCK has in fact gone further than the court in Montgomery towards patient centricity.

The key reason why this shift was needed, and was indeed made, was that there has been an increase in recognition for the “need to treat patient autonomy seriously” in the law.[42] This is a result of the developments within the medical profession as well as the rest of society which have shifted patient autonomy to a position of prime importance[43] in what has been a “seismic shift in medical ethics, and in societal attitudes towards the practice of medicine”[44].

This evolution in the nature of the patient-doctor relationship in Singapore is in light of the “level of education and access to knowledge” of ordinary people.[45] A patient, during the advice stage, is no longer a passive recipient of care but has become an “active interlocutor in whom ultimately rests the power to decide”.[46] This has resulted in a new generation of patients who have become much more informed about “medical matters, their choices and rights”.[47]

Furthermore, a patient has a right to decide and choose whether or not to undergo medical treatment.[48] Such decisions and choices are “ultimately the patient’s to make”, while a doctor’s function is simply to “empower and enable the patient to make that decision by giving him the relevant and material information”.[49] Lastly, a decision on what information patients should be given is only partially a medical science assessment, with the other part being an assessment of a patient’s personal concerns and priorities.[50]

However, a balance needs to be struck between patient autonomy and beneficence (i.e. the doctor’s provision of benefits to a patient through the fair weighing of benefits against risks and costs).[51] This balance necessitates another balance to be struck between the doctor’s perspective and the patient’s perspective.[52] A “proper balance”[53] must take into account the fact that a doctor is able to be objective and dispassionate in making judgment calls as to the significance of information while a patient, on the other hand, might be emotional and place inappropriate emphasis on risks.[54]

Another reason that necessitated the “carefully calibrated shift” is that rising healthcare costs as well as defensive medicine are “real concerns” that the courts need to bear in mind when they are approaching the question of legal reform.[55] The court in HCK noted that this was not a sufficient reason to “shut the door to reform entirely” and was a minor issue when only a partial reform is attempted.[56] Nonetheless, it is suggested that this may well have been one of the decisive reasons why the court chose to adapt Montgomery to better fit the Singapore context, especially given the way healthcare expenditure is funded in Singapore.[57]

 

2.       “Relevant and Material”

 

The first unique feature of the HCK test is the usage of the phrase “relevant and material” information.[58] Therefore, there appears to be a test of both relevancy and materiality in the HCK test. This is as opposed to the use of “material” risks in cases such as Rogers[59] and Montgomery[60], which imply a test of materiality alone. The UK courts have in fact stressed that the test in Montgomery is materiality and not relevance.[61]

As noted by the UK courts, the tests of relevance and materiality might conceivably be different[62], and the author agrees that these concepts are indeed distinguishable. Nonetheless, a difficulty arises in the conceptualisation of information that is material but not relevant to a patient. If the information is material to a patient, it is highly likely that it would also be relevant to that patient.[63] On the other hand, relevant information is not necessarily material.[64] Thus, the test of materiality is a subset of the broader test of relevancy. As such, whether the addition of the requirement of relevancy has any effect on the scope of information that needs to be disclosed remains to be seen in future Singapore cases.

As there was no specified reason in the Singapore judgment as to why the word “relevant” was added in HCK, any discussion on this would be entirely speculative. However, it is entirely plausible that the court intended to limit the range of possible information that a patient would be able to claim for by adding the additional requirement of relevancy. This is likely to be because of the expanded scope of disclosure under the HCK test that is not confined to risks and alternatives. Therefore, it is submitted that the intended effect of including the word “relevant” into the test was to help guard against the practice of defensive medicine by doctors in Singapore by limiting the scope of information that needs to be disclosed.

It is respectfully submitted that defensive medicine[65] is the practice by doctors of adopting “what they think is legally safe”, despite their beliefs as to what is best for the patient.[66] The court in HCK stated that the “concerns in defensive medicine pertain mainly to diagnosis and treatment.”[67] However, in the context of advice, it is possible for defensive practices to exist. It is respectfully submitted that this could take the form of disclosing more information than is necessary in the doctor’s attempt to be legally safe, despite the fact that such information may not be necessary or may even entail unforeseen harmful effects.

The disclosure of excessive information may result in the wastage of medical time and resources and risks frightening a patient, thus leading them to reach an unbalanced decision.[68] Defensive medicine also results in higher medical costs and a wastage of precious medical resources.[69] Other foreseeable detrimental effects of defensive medicine may include higher insurance costs[70], compromising of the quality of medical care[71], denial of access to medical care and attention, and a tendency towards unnecessary or sub-optimal medical decisions.[72] The possibility of such defensive practices is exacerbated under the HCK test because information is not confined to material risks concerning the treatment and its alternatives[73] but instead involves the broad types of material information that were identified in the Canadian case of Dickson v Pinder[74].

It is important to note that in a recent Singapore case, defensive medicine was defined differently as encompassing “the situation where a doctor takes a certain course of action in order to avoid legal liability rather than to secure the patient’s best interests”.[75] In that case, the court stated that overwhelming patients with a deluge of information on unlikely risks is not defensive medicine.[76] The reason given for this is because “giving too much information will not avoid legal liability” because bombarding the patient with information leaves the patient more confused and less able to make a proper decision, thus leading to legal liability for failing to obtain informed consent.[77] This position, unlike the definition adopted above[78], is not dependent on a doctor’s subjective belief of what will allow him to avoid legal liability.

While there is merit in framing defensive medicine as excluding situations where legal liability is not avoided, with respect, this definition is under-inclusive and does not fully capture the potential range of behaviour that is defensive in nature. In essence, if a doctor is misguided and therefore fails in his attempt to avoid legal liability, that does not make the attempted defensive actions any less defensive in nature. In any event, misguided attempts at defensive action, whether or not considered to be “defensive medicine”, would still have the same detrimental effects as defensive medicine itself. Indeed, the Ministry of Health in Singapore has highlighted that there is a very real possibility of over-disclosure of risks being taken as attempted defensive action.[79] Therefore, it is respectfully submitted that it would be helpful to recognise excessive disclosure of information as “defensive medicine” so that its risk can be properly accounted for.

Lastly, the court in HCK, although providing a definition and test for materiality, did not do the same for relevancy. As such, there is a lack of a clear distinction between the two requirements of relevancy and materiality. Therefore, despite any intended limiting effect of the introduction of a relevancy requirement, the practical effect of this addition is likely to be negligible. This is because the test is conjunctive, hence the information must have been both relevant and material to a reasonable patient in the patient’s position. Thus, the additional requirement will likely have no effect as doctors will not be sure whether a material piece of information is irrelevant and therefore disclose it nonetheless.[80] As such, any intended additional guidance or reassurance is negated and further clarification by the courts is necessary in order to delineate any additional considerations that doctors should be mindful of.

 

3.       Types of Information

 

The second unique feature of the HCK test is that the information that needs to be disclosed is wider than the information defined in Montgomery.

As aforementioned, the court in HCK expanded the information that could be considered material to include the broad types of material information that were identified in the Canadian case of Dickson v Pinder.[81] Furthermore, this list is non-exhaustive and the court left the door open for other types of information. The court made reference to the idea of certainty[82] which could potentially lead to more information being relevant where for example there is uncertainty present (such as information on alternative diagnoses).[83]

It is, however, noted that the case of Montgomery was concerned with a patient alleging that she was not informed about the risk of shoulder dystocia in her case.[84] The case of HCK, on the other hand, concerned a patient who alleged that the advice on a Gallium scan and its limitations, the importance of the morphological scans, and peculiarity of the pancreas in relation to functional scans were insufficient to allow him to make an informed decision.[85] As a result, while the court in Montgomery was solely concerned with risks, the court in HCK had a wider range of information that it had to contend with. As a result, forms of information other than risks would not have been the focus of the Supreme court in Montgomery.

Therefore, it is possible that future UK decisions might not limit material information to risks of treatment and alternatives and expand them in a similar way to HCK. In the UK courts, it was in fact noted in obiter that although Montgomery involved the provision of information in order to determine whether to undergo a particular treatment, it could potentially be expanded to cover all aspects of advice.[86] As such, in the future, this may no longer be a distinguishing factor of the HCK test and may be applicable in other jurisdictions.

 

4.       Unknown Information

 

The third unique feature of the HCK test is that where a doctor is not in possession of the information that is relevant and material, the case will no longer be assessed under the category of negligent advice but instead be assessed as a negligent diagnosis or treatment case and therefore be subjected to the normal Bolam-Bolitho test.[87] The cases of Montgomery and Rogers are silent on this aspect. This scenario involves a doctor who lacks the information through his own fault and not scenarios where the risk was not even comprehended by medical knowledge at the time of the alleged breach.[88]

While the end-result of this re-characterisation is correct in principle, the classification of such a case may not be as straightforward as it seems.

For cases where a doctor is unaware of information due to a failure to conduct certain procedures on the patient, that would rightly fit under the rubric of diagnosis. Diagnosis involves establishing the medical needs of a patient and includes the obtaining, consideration, and analysis of information gathered followed by the formation of provisional conclusions on the best way to proceed.[89] An analogous situation to this surfaced in a subsequent recent case.[90]

However, where a doctor is unaware of information due to a lack of factual or technical knowledge of a particular risk, such a situation is not as clear-cut.

Firstly, treatment involves the carrying out of the solution chosen by the patient as well as the care the patient receives.[91] If a patient fails to receive information on a risk of a specific procedure, the treatment of the patient by the doctor is not itself defective. The issue is instead whether the patient would have chosen the same solution had the patient known of the information.

Secondly, diagnosis involves establishing the medical needs of a patient and determining the best way to proceed.[92] Here, an argument can be made that the doctor might have been negligent in not ascertaining the best way to proceed properly.

Thirdly, advice involves the presentation of information to the patient and includes recommendations as well as other material information.[93] While it is agreed that “one cannot give what one does not have” [94], this does not necessarily stop the lack of information from being a negligent advice scenario. It is correct that a doctor without the material information cannot provide that information to the patient. However, this also means that the doctor has failed to advise the patient properly as a result of that lack of information, which is arguably still a failure in advising.

Nonetheless, the outcome of the re-characterisation is that the Bolam-Bolitho test is applied to cases where the doctor lacks the information that is considered material which is correct in principle. This is because a failure of a doctor to be aware of medical information due to his own ignorance is essentially a failure of a medical nature and therefore recourse should be sought from the Bolam-Bolitho test. It is submitted that an alternative and clearer conceptual approach would be to analyse it plainly from the perspective of whether the doctor “was negligent in not having such information”[95] without the need for re-characterising the case as diagnosis or treatment.

 

5.       Remaining Ambiguities

 

While the current framework provided by the HCK test has many positive features, there remains some ambiguity and uncertainty that permeates through the test. There are two prominent ambiguities that have yet to be discussed and are important to highlight at this juncture.

The first prominent ambiguity that surfaces from the HCK test relates to the level of flexibility that has been injected into the analysis as compared to Montgomery. In the Montgomery test, once the conditions specified in the definition of materiality[96] are fulfilled, the information is considered material. This is because the definition uses the phrase “is whether”, which results in the conditions being phrased as the test of materiality itself.[97]

On the other hand, the definition of materiality in the HCK test[98] uses the phrase “having regard to”. This means that the HCK test does not specify automatic conditions in order for the information to be considered material but provides factors that are taken into account in determining materiality.[99] This approach of treating the conditions as factors results in fluidity in determining what information is material, thus leading to uncertainty.

This fluidity from treating the conditions as factors, coupled with “common sense” playing a more powerful role[100], and further exacerbated by the fact that the “tests” adopted from Montgomery are in itself inherently difficult for doctors to determine materiality in practice, results in a problematic level of uncertainty. The combined effect of these would mean that a doctor will have great difficulty in practice in determining whether a particular piece of information is material or not. This would result in defensive practices such as disclosing more information than is necessary in the doctor’s attempt to be legally safe, accompanied by the attendant detrimental effects[101]. The Ministry of Health has highlighted that doctors are indeed having difficulty in applying the HCK test.[102]

The second prominent ambiguity relates to the classification of a doctor’s actions in the three aspects of medical care (diagnosis, treatment and advice). In HCK, the Court of Appeal stated that the three aspects of medical care are not monolithic and cannot always be demarcated clearly.[103] The court then noted that the different aspects of medical care will often be in play concurrently.[104] These aspects “emerge and submerge repeatedly” at different points in the doctor-patient relationship.[105] The court acknowledged therefore that the application of differing standards of assessment is not a straightforward task.[106]

While the effect of this makes it difficult for a doctor to determine which standard of care will apply to any given situation, it is submitted that the uncertainty created by this ambiguity will have negligible practical effect on medical advice. This is because defensive practices would result in doctors choosing to apply the more demanding standard of care to the situation and this would indeed be the HCK test, a favourable consequence.

 

IV.              CONCLUSION

 

In conclusion, patient-centricity has come a long way from the days of Sidaway. In some respects, the HCK test has gone further than the Montgomery test in favour of patients but in other aspects it has been more conservative.

The test has many complexities and nuances that strike a delicate balance between the Montgomery test and the Bolam-Bolitho test. The HCK test as a whole highlights a shift in emphasis towards patient autonomy. The three-stage inquiry separates the various components of the test to ensure that analysis is done in a systematic way. The scope of information that needs to be disclosed appears to be expanded in HCK. However, this is balanced against an additional test of relevancy, a test which needs further clarification. Defensive medicine is also mitigated to some extent by the requirement that a doctor does not indiscriminately bombard the patient with information like an information dump.[107] These adaptations by the Court of Appeal were arguably necessary to adapt to Singapore’s context.[108]

Nonetheless, what is clear is that the HCK test seeks to strike a unique balance in Singapore between patient autonomy and beneficence. The HCK test, in light of its various features and aspects, has thus set a new standard of care required of Singapore doctors in advice scenarios that has sought to place an appropriate emphasis on both the patient and the doctor.

 



* LLB (Hons) (NUS), Class of 2019.

[1] A classification that was made in Dr Khoo James & Anor v Gunapathy d/o Muniandy, [2002] SGCA 25; [2002] 1 SLR(R) 1024 and elaborated on in Hii Chii Kok v Ooi Peng Jin London Lucien and Another, [2017] SGCA 38; 2017 2 SLR 492 at [89].

[2] Sidaway v Bethlem Royal Hospital Governors, [1985] AC 871 (HL (Eng)).

[3] Dr Khoo James & Anor v Gunapathy d/o Muniandy, [2002] SGCA 25; [2002] 1 SLR(R) 1024 at [65].

[4] Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board, [2015] 1 AC 1430 (SC (Eng)).

[5] Rogers v Whitaker, [1992] 175 CLR 479 (HCA).

[6] Such as the American case of Canterbury v Spence, [1972] 464 F 2d 772, the Canadian case of Reibl v Hughes, [1980] 2 SCR 880 (SCC) and the Malaysian case of Foo Fio Na v Dr Soo Fook Mun & Anor, [2007] 1 MLJ 593 (FC).

[7] Hii Chii Kok v Ooi Peng Jin London Lucien and Another, [2017] SGCA 38; [2017] 2 SLR 492.

[8] Keith Jieren Thirumaran, “The exceptions allowing for Non-Disclosure of Information by Doctors in Singapore – Part 2 of the HCK Series” (2019) Singapore Law Review, 11 Juris Illuminae (online).

[9] Supra note 7 at [132].

[10] Ibid at [132].

[11] Supra note 7 at [134]; Lam Kwok Tai Leslie v Singapore Medical Council, [2017] SGHC 260; [2017] 5 SLR 1168 at [31].

[12] Supra note 7 at [149]; Lam Kwok Tai Leslie v Singapore Medical Council, [2017] SGHC 260; [2017] 5 SLR 1168 at [31].

[13] Supra note 7 at [144].

[14] Ibid.

[15] Ibid at [137].

[16] Ibid.

[17] Ibid at [139] and [143]. In determining materiality, the court gave the example of risks and opined that the likelihood and severity of the risk would determine materiality to a reasonable patient – Ibid at [140].

[18] Ibid at [145].

[19] In Montgomery, the types of information only included “any material risks involved in any recommended treatment, and of any reasonable alternative or variant treatments” – See: Supra note 4 at [87].

[20] Supra note 7 at [132] and [138].

[21] Dickson v Pinder, [2010] ABQB 269 at [68].

[22] Ibid at [68]. Supra note 7 at [132] and [138].

[23] Supra note 7 at [143]. For example, “where the diagnosis is uncertain, more information pertaining to other possible diagnoses will also become material” – See: Supra note 7 at [143].

[24] Supra note 7 at [133].

[25] Ibid at [133].

[26] Ibid at [134].

[27] Supra note 8.

[28] Supra note 7 at [134].

[29] Ibid.

[30] Ibid.

[31] Ibid at [148].

[32] Ibid at [149].

[33] Ibid.

[34] Ibid at [150].

[35] Ibid.

[36] Ibid at [151]. In this situation, rather than justifying a doctor’s withholding of information, the reality is that the duty to advise the patient is itself suspended out of necessity.

[37] Ibid at [151].

[38] Ibid at [152]. The court also elaborated on some examples such as patients with anxiety disorders or are easily frightened as well as patients “whose state of mind, intellectual abilities or education” make it “impossible or extremely difficult” to weigh the risks and understand the reality.

[39] Ibid at [153].

[40] Ibid.

[41] Ibid at [85].

[42] Ibid at [116].

[43] Ibid at [118].

[44] Ibid at [120].

[45] Ibid at [119].

[46] Ibid at [113].

[47] Ibid at [118], citing Singapore Medical Council, Ethical Code and Ethical Guidelines, Singapore: Singapore Medical Council, 2016.

[48] Ibid at [125].

[49] Ibid at [97].

[50] Ibid at [125].

[51] Ibid at [120].

[52] Ibid.

[53] Ibid at [131].

[54] Ibid at [113].

[55] Ibid at [85].

[56] Ibid.

[57] Healthcare in Singapore is largely funded privately or through insurance schemes, although government subsidies may be provided. On the other hand, the UK’s National Health Service is financed by the government through taxes. As a result, in the event that an overly patient-centric approach results in defensive medicine, the increase in healthcare costs would have a greater impact on Singapore society that in the UK. This is because it would mean higher out-of-pocket expenditure by those in need of healthcare as well as higher insurance premiums for the general public.

[58] Supra note 7 at [132].

[59] Supra note 5 at [16].

[60] Supra note 4 at [87].

[61] Regina (M & Another) v Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, [2017] 4 WLR 130 (CA (Eng)) at [79].

[62] Ibid at [79].

[63] If a patient is reasonably likely to attach significance to the information (thereby considering it material), then there is no conceivable way for the information to be irrelevant to the patient. This is because where a patient considers information material, the information must logically be in some way related or have some connection to the scenario the patient is in. If the information were not relevant because it was not related or connected to the patient in any way whatsoever, no patient would reasonably attach significance to it in the first place.

[64] This is clear from the facts of HCK where certain specific information on the test (like the number of times it had been used before) were not material, although they were relevant to the patient as it was the test that the patient had undergone – See: Supra note 7 at [186].

[65] It is important to note that there is a recent Singapore case that takes a different view of defensive medicine and this is discussed later in this commentary: see note 75 below and its accompanying text.

[66] Supra note 2 at 887.

[67] Supra note 7 at [84] & [87].

[68] Tong Seok May Joanne v Yau Hok Man Gordon, [2012] SGHC 252 at [76].

[69] Supra note 3 at [144].

[70] Response by Chief Justice Sundaresh Menon at the Opening of the Legal Year 2016 (11 January 2016) at para 43.

[71] Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (1 April 2019) vol 94 “Protecting Patients’ Interests and Supporting the Medical Community” (Gan Kim Yong, Minister for Health) – which states: “In the current climate of uncertainty, there is a real risk that medical practitioners will adopt defensive medicine. There is evidence that this is already happening. Fearing that they might be called out should a complication occur, doctors are likely to overwhelm patients with voluminous information on multiple unlikely risks, protecting themselves legally but confusing patients.”

[72] Chief Justice Sundaresh Menon, “Evolving Paradigms for Medical Litigation in Singapore”, (28 October 2014) Obstetrical & Gynaecological Society of Singapore at [33].

[73] Supra note 7 at [132] & [138].

[74] Supra note 21 at [68].

[75] Singapore Medical Council v Lim Lian Arn [2019] SGHC 172 at [53].

[76] Ibid at [53].

[77] Ibid at [54].

[78] See note 66 above and its accompanying text.

[79] Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (1 April 2019) vol 94 “Protecting Patients’ Interests and Supporting the Medical Community” (Gan Kim Yong, Minister for Health) – which states: “In the current climate of uncertainty, there is a real risk that medical practitioners will adopt defensive medicine. There is evidence that this is already happening. Fearing that they might be called out should a complication occur, doctors are likely to overwhelm patients with voluminous information on multiple unlikely risks, protecting themselves legally but confusing patients.”

[80] Being unsure, a doctor is likely to behave defensively in an attempt to remain legally safe, thus resulting in the disclosure of material information whether relevant or irrelevant. This final outcome would also have originated under the Montgomery test.

[81] Supra note 7 at [132] and [138]. Supra note 21 at [68].

[82] Supra note 7 at [143].

[83] Ibid.

[84] Supra note 4 at [13].

[85] Supra note 7 at [47].

[86] Spencer v Hillingdon Hospital NHS Trust, [2015] EWHC 1058 at [32].

[87] Supra note 7 at [133].

[88] This is because in such a scenario, a reasonable medical practitioner cannot be expected to have possession of such information beyond medical science – See: Rosenberg v Percival, [2001] HCA 18 at [67], Gummow J.

[89] Supra note 7 at [96].

[90] Noor Azlin Bte Abdul Rahman v Changi General Hospital Pte Ltd [2018] SGHC 35 at [55]; Noor Azlin bte Abdul Rahman v Changi General Hospital Pte Ltd and others [2019] SGCA 13 at [80] – [82].

[91] Supra note 7 at [98].

[92] Ibid at [96].

[93] Ibid at [97].

[94] Ibid at [133].

[95] Supra note 90 at [55].

[96] “The test of materiality is whether, in the circumstances of the particular case, a reasonable person in the patient’s position would be likely to attach significance to the risk, or the doctor is or should reasonably be aware that the particular patient would be likely to attach significance to it.” – See: Supra note 4 at [87].

[97] Supra note 4 at [87].

[98] “Materiality is to be assessed from the vantage point of the patient, having regard to matters that the patient in question was reasonably likely to have attached significance to in arriving at his decision, or matters which the doctor in fact knew or had reason to believe that the patient in question would have placed particular emphasis on.” – See: Supra note 7 at [137].

[99] Supra note 7 at [137].

[100] Supra note 7 at [139] & [143].

[101] See note 68-72 above and its accompanying text.

[102] Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (11 February 2019) vol 94 “Informed Consent for Medical Procedures Following Recent Case where Orthopaedic Doctor was Fined” (Dr Lam Pin Min, Minister of State for Health) – which states: “There has been feedback on the considerable confusion amongst medical practitioners on the requirements on informed consent and material information, and how the modified Montgomery Test and the ECEG should apply. … I am clearly aware of the concerns of many medical professionals on the Modified Montgomery Test. I have personally received feedback from fellow medical practitioners especially on the requirement on informed consent and material information, and how this new test should be applied. There is also feedback from the medical community that this may lead to defensive medicine and escalation of healthcare cost.”

[103] Supra note 7 at [90].

[104] Ibid.

[105] Ibid at [91].

[106] Ibid at [92].

[107] Ibid at [143].

[108] Supra note 57.

The Exceptions Allowing For Non-Disclosure of Information by Doctors in Singapore – Part 2 of the HCK Series

The PDF version of this article can be found here.


 

the Exceptions Allowing for Non-disclosure of information by Doctors in Singapore – part 2 of the hck series

 

Keith Jieren Thirumaran*

 

 

I.                    INTRODUCTION

 

In the landmark decision of Hii Chii Kok v Ooi Peng Jin London Lucien [HCK][1], the Singapore Court of Appeal adopted a modified and unique test in the context of medical advice for doctors in Singapore. In Part 1 of the HCK series[2], an overview of the HCK test was provided together with a detailed analysis of various aspects of the test. Part 2 of the HCK series will now focus specifically on stage 3 of the HCK test relating to the situations where a doctor is justified in withholding information from the patient regardless of its materiality, otherwise known as the exceptions to a doctor’s duty of disclosure.

 

II.                 OVERVIEW OF HCK TEST’S STAGE 3

 

The HCK test formulated by the Singapore Court of Appeal is a three-stage test. The first stage involves the patient’s identification of the information not provided and why it should be regarded as relevant and material.[3] The second stage involves determining whether the doctor was in possession of the information identified as relevant and material.[4]

The third stage involves an examination of the reasons why the doctor chose to withhold the information from the patient.[5] The Court would determine whether the “doctor was justified in withholding the information”.[6] However, this would not be measured by the Bolam-Bolitho test even though it is informed by medical considerations.[7] After determining that the doctor’s reasons were justified, the Court would then determine whether it “was a sound judgment having regard to the standards of a reasonable and competent doctor”.[8] At this stage, expert medical evidence will have some significance because there is still “an element of professional judgment involved”.[9]

The Court did not want to confine or restrict the situations that could be justifiable, but held that courts would consider all the circumstances in determining whether the withholding of information was justified.[10] However, the Court elaborated on 3 non-exhaustive categories of situations that would justify non-disclosure.[11]

The first situation allowing for the withholding of information is where the patient does not wish to know the information.[12] This is treated as a “factual question” on the existence and scope of a patient’s waiver of the information and will not usually involve expert opinion.[13]

The second situation is where there is an emergency scenario such as when there is a threat of death or serious harm to the patient while the patient lacks decision-making capacity and there is no appropriate substitute decision-maker.[14] In this situation, rather than justifying a doctor’s withholding of information, the duty to advise the patient is itself suspended out of necessity.[15] For this situation, the Bolam-Bolitho test will apply because medical expert opinion will be “crucial” in determining whether the urgency of the situation is such that seeking opportunities to provide information to the patient can be sacrificed.[16]

The third situation involves therapeutic privilege and applies where a doctor “reasonably believes that the very act of giving particular information would cause the patient serious physical or mental harm”.[17] For this situation, expert medical and psychological evidence will “be helpful or even crucial” to the Court but the Bolam-Bolitho test will not be applied as the focus is on whether the Court is of the opinion that the patient would likely be harmed when informed of the material information.[18] The Court of Appeal also elaborated on some examples, such as patients with anxiety disorders, patients who are easily frightened and patients “whose state of mind, intellectual abilities or education” make it “impossible or extremely difficult” to weigh the risks and understand the reality.[19]

 

III.              ANALYSIS OF STAGE 3 OF THE HCK TEST

 

It is evident from the HCK test that stage 3 is much more detailed and specific in its elaboration of the various exceptions to a doctor’s duty of disclosure, as compared to the UK Supreme Court’s test in Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [Montgomery][20]. The HCK decision draws inspiration from the Montgomery decision while simultaneously building upon the existing pronouncements on the exceptions to disclosure. This section will now explore the features of the HCK test’s stage 3 that set it apart from the decision in Montgomery.

 

1.       Expansion of exceptions using an open-ended approach

 

The first unique and distinguishing feature of the HCK test’s stage 3 relates to the situations (or exceptions) that entitle doctors to withhold relevant and material information.

The Court in HCK adopted an open-ended circumstance-based approach regarding what kinds of situations would justify the withholding of information.[21] The Court would determine whether the doctor had reasonably justifiable reasons for withholding the information and whether it “was a sound judgment having regard to the standards of a reasonable and competent doctor”.[22]

At first glance, this might seem like a reversion back to the Bolam-Bolitho test. However, the Court has emphasised that this would not be the case[23] and medical evidence merely has significance due to “the element of professional judgment involved”[24]. Although the second aspect of this approach takes into account medical evidence, this is only done to the extent that medical considerations are involved.[25] As such, in the final analysis, it is the Court that must be “satisfied that the non-disclosure of information was justified” on the facts of the case and not whether the non-disclosure was accepted as proper by a responsible body of medical men.[26]

Insofar as the balance between patient autonomy and doctor’s opinions are concerned, HCK appears to take a patient-centric approach by not applying the Bolam-Bolitho test across the board for all situations that justify the withholding of information. While Montgomery is silent on the tests for assessing the situations justifying the withholding of information, support for Singapore’s position can be found in the Australian High Court where it was stated that medical practice and opinion are still relevant although it is no longer conclusive because the decision belongs to the courts.[27] As such, although patient autonomy now plays an important role, this is balanced against the fact that medical evidence will still be taken into consideration, albeit not in the same manner as Bolam-Bolitho.

However, insofar as the types of situations where non-disclosure might be justifiable are concerned, the Court in HCK has gone further than Montgomery by applying a flexible test that is broad and leaves the possibility open for other situations. While it may be argued that the open-ended nature will add to the ambiguities and uncertainties discussed in Part 1 of the HCK series[28], it is submitted that this will likely have no immediate impact on doctors who are likely to continue relying solely on the three well-established exceptions. This is a result that would have eventuated under the Montgomery test as well. Nonetheless, it does give some flexibility and manoeuvrability to the courts in the event of a future case outside the scope of the three established exceptions that has special facts that justify a doctor’s withholding of information.

 

2.       Details on the application of exceptions

 

The second unique and distinguishing feature of the HCK test’s stage 3 is that it elaborates and provides the exact conditions that need to be satisfied in order to successfully rely on the situations (or exceptions) that entitle doctors to withhold relevant and material information. As the Supreme Court in Montgomery did not elaborate on the exceptions, it remains to be seen whether the standards adopted will be the same.

Where the patient does not wish to know the information, the issue would be treated as a “factual question” on the existence and scope of a patient’s waiver of the information and will not usually involve expert opinion.[29] This must be correct as a doctor’s decision on whether there has been a waiver is not dependent on medical expertise[30] but is merely dependent on whether a waiver of information actually exists on the facts.

In an emergency situation, the Bolam-Bolitho test will apply as medical expert opinion will be “crucial” in determining whether the urgency of the situation is such that seeking opportunities to provide information to the patient can be sacrificed.[31] This is correct as the urgency of treatment is essentially a medical issue and an area in which judicial wisdom has its limits.[32]

The final situation dealt with in HCK where a doctor can withhold information from the patient is therapeutic privilege. Therapeutic privilege applies where “the doctor reasonably believes that the very act of giving particular information would cause the patient serious physical or mental harm”.[33]

In cases involving therapeutic privilege, expert medical and psychological evidence will “be helpful or even crucial” to the Court but the Bolam-Bolitho test will not be applied as the focus is on whether the Court is objectively of the opinion that the patient would likely be harmed when informed of the material information.[34] Here, the Court adopts the middle ground by recognizing that medical opinion is relevant but reserving the final determination on whether the patient would be harmed to the Courts.

The necessity of therapeutic privilege in any case is largely a medical decision to make. This is because determining the effect of the information on a patient involves analysis that extends to the state of mind and psychological condition of the patient, of which doctors have a degree of experience with assessing in light of their medical training. However, a decision on the applicability of therapeutic privilege would take away a patient’s autonomy in making a choice and as such it is understandable that the Court did not wish to leave such a decision entirely to the medical profession. One concern that arises is whether interfering with medical opinion on therapeutic privilege goes against the principle that “a judge, unschooled and unskilled in the art of medicine, has no business adjudicating matters over which medical experts themselves cannot come to agreement”.[35] However, it appears that the Court in HCK was only reserving the final decision on therapeutic privilege to itself. This can be viewed as a Bolitho-style test of logic and consistency. Therefore, if interpreted this way, the courts reserving the right of making the final determination on therapeutic privilege does not result in any inconsistency.

A common concern that arises out of therapeutic privilege is that it has the “potential to ‘swallow’ the doctor’s obligation of disclosure”.[36] If left unchecked, the effect of the therapeutic privilege exception could render patient autonomy otiose or non-existent. This would occur where doctors are given too much freedom in exercising the privilege.

While the Court in Montgomery did not elaborate on the scope of this exception, the Court in HCK gave the exception a broad and expansive scope. This was because the Court felt that “doctors should have a measure of latitude in invoking the therapeutic privilege”.[37] Nonetheless, the Court in HCK stressed that therapeutic privilege should not be abused to prevent a patient that is capable of making a choice from doing so just because the doctor believes that it is contrary to the patient’s best interests[38]. This point was also made in Montgomery.[39] The broad scope of therapeutic privilege under HCK raises two areas of concern with regards to medical paternalism.

The first area of concern involves the kind of potential harm that would permit a doctor to withhold information. The position in Montgomery allows withholding information where it would be “seriously detrimental to the patient’s health”[40] while in Rogers v Whitaker withholding information is allowed where it would “prove damaging to a patient”[41]. Notwithstanding the cautionary statements made by the courts earlier, these vague tests have the potential to include the effects of making a bad decision as a type of harm under therapeutic privilege. This would render patient autonomy illusory because a doctor can simply claim that an informed choice not to undergo treatment would result in harm to the patient simply because the patient would not be getting treated. Under HCK, the position appears to be similar and includes both serious “physical” harm and “mental” harm.[42] This potentially allows physical harm caused by not undergoing treatment to qualify.[43] This is further supported by the fact that the privilege applies even where a patient may be “easily frightened out of having even relatively safe treatments that can drastically improve their quality of life”.[44]

The second area of concern involves the type and condition of patients who may potentially have therapeutic privilege invoked against them. Under HCK, therapeutic privilege extends to cases where a patient’s decision-making capabilities are impaired to an appreciable degree, although they may not strictly lack mental capacity.[45] In determining whether the patient suffers from an impairment of his decision-making abilities, regard will be given to the benefits of the treatment, the relatively low risks present, and the probability that even with suitable assistance the patient would refuse treatment due to a misapprehension of information.[46] The factors that are taken into account suggest that a patient who has made a mistake in his decision, and as a result has not chosen something that would objectively be considered good for him, may be considered as having an impairment in decision-making abilities. This mimics medical paternalism where the patient’s choice is overturned because it is not good for the patient. This is difficult to reconcile with the principle that a person should not be treated as unable to make a decision merely because he makes an unwise decision under the Singapore Mental Capacity Act.[47]

Furthermore, although the Court in HCK emphasized that a patient’s decision-making ability had to be “impaired to an appreciable degree”, the Court tapered this with the inclusion of patients who were easily frightened and whom it would be extremely difficult to explain the true reality to.[48] To some extent, this is contradictory with the earlier statement that a patient who is “capable of making a choice” should be allowed to do so even if it is contrary to the patient’s best interests.[49]

The combined effect of these two areas of concern is that the balance between patient autonomy and medical paternalism becomes blurred. While medical decisions in clear-cut scenarios of mentally incapacitated patients should be left to the doctor and a clear-minded and informed patient should be allowed to make a “bad” decision, the line becomes very fine in the grey area where a patient has mental capacity but his decision-making ability is impaired. This presents a difficult tension between allowing the patient to “wrongly” weigh the information in the interests of patient autonomy and allowing medical paternalism to protect the patient from his own decisions and their resultant harms under beneficence.

As such, the current position in respect of the scope of the therapeutic privilege exception in Singapore is unclear and requires further clarification. The effect of the current uncertainty surrounding this privilege is that doctors will not be comfortable invoking therapeutic privilege in the grey area where their patient has mental capacity along with some impairments in decision-making abilities. This may well be the desirable position to remain in in order to give full effect to patient autonomy and allow patients to make “bad” decisions.

 

IV.              CONCLUSION

 

In conclusion, although the HCK test has many positive features and has made great progress in the direction of patient autonomy[50], stage 3 of the HCK test presents certain difficulties that have the potential to derail the progress made in the former stages of the test. The expansion of the potential exceptions and situations for the withholding of information entails different forms of analysis within each exception. The HCK test provides details on how each exception should be applied, some of which bring back notions of medical opinion and evidence playing roles. However, the adoption of therapeutic privilege from English and Australian law requires further thought. Nonetheless, overall the HCK test strikes a unique and delicate balance between patient autonomy and beneficence in Singapore.

 



*LLB (Hons) (NUS), Class of 2019.

[1] Hii Chii Kok v Ooi Peng Jin London Lucien and Another, [2017] SGCA 38; [2017] 2 SLR 492.

[2] Keith Jieren Thirumaran, “The Unique Standard of Care for Doctors in Singapore – Part 1 of the HCK Series” (2019) Singapore Law Review, 11 Juris Illuminae (online).

[3] Supra note 1 at [132].

[4] Ibid at [133].

[5] Ibid at [134].

[6] Ibid.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Ibid at [134].

[9] Ibid at [148].

[10] Ibid at [149].

[11] Ibid.

[12] Ibid at [150].

[13] Ibid.

[14] Ibid at [151].

[15] Ibid.

[16] Ibid.

[17] Ibid at [152].

[18] Ibid at [153].

[19] Ibid at [152].

[20] Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board, [2015] 1 AC 1430 (SC (Eng)).

[21] Supra note 1 at [149].

[22] Ibid at [134].

[23] Ibid.

[24] Ibid at [148].

[25] Ibid at [149].

[26] Ibid at [134].

[27] Rosenberg v Percival, [2001] HCA 18 at [7], Gleeson CJ.

[28] Supra note 2.

[29] Supra note 1 at [150].

[30] Supra note 20 at [13].

[31] Supra note 1 at [151].

[32] Dr Khoo James & Anor v Gunapathy d/o Muniandy, [2002] SGCA 25; [2002] 1 SLR(R) 1024 at [144]. Supra note 1 at [81].

[33] Supra note 1 at [152].

[34] Ibid at [153].

[35] Supra note 32.

[36] Meyer Estate v Rogers, [1991] O.J. No. 139, 2 O.R. (3d) 356 at [31].

[37] Supra note 1 at [152].

[38] Ibid at [153].

[39] Supra note 20 at [91].

[40] Ibid at [88].

[41] Rogers v Whitaker, [1992] 175 CLR 479 (HCA) at [9].

[42] Supra note 1 at [152].

[43] Ibid.

[44] Ibid.

[45] Ibid at [152]-[153]. Examples provided by the court included patients with anxiety disorders, geriatric patients who may be easily frightened out of relatively safe treatments, and patients whose state of mind, intellectual abilities or education make it impossible or extremely difficult to explain the true reality to them.

[46] Ibid at [153].

[47] Mental Capacity Act (Cap 177A, 2010 Rev Ed Sing), s 3(4).

[48] Supra note 1 at [152].

[49] Ibid at [152]; Supra note 20 at [91].

[50] Supra note 2.

Terrorism and the European Court of Human Rights

The PDF version of this article is available for download here.


Terrorism and the European Court of Human Rights

Keith Jieren Thirumaran

I. INTRODUCTION

The Council of Europe currently consists of 47 European Countries.1 In order to join and remain a member of the Council of Europe,2 countries must ratify and adhere to the European Convention on Human Rights [Convention].3 Through the Convention, the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) is empowered to ensure that the Convention is adhered to4 as well as to develop binding5 case law to progress the interpretation of the Convention. The ECtHR interprets the Convention as a “living instrument”6 which has led to an expansive scope of its provisions. This article will examine the impact of developments in the ECtHR’s case law on governments and public officials in the context of combating terrorism. In particular, this article will examine the restrictions that the ECtHR has placed on parties to the Convention (“Member States”) under Articles 2, 3 and 6 of the Convention. It will be submitted subsequently that although restrictions on governments and public officials are generally necessary, the restrictions of the ECtHR are too far-reaching and unreasonable in the context of protecting the lives of innocent civilians.

II. RIGHTS AFFORDED UNDER THE CONVENTION

All humans have the right to life and this is enshrined in Article 2 of the Convention. Under Article 3 of the Convention, all humans also have the right to be free from torture as well as inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Terrorists are defined as people who use violence and intimidation to coerce governments and communities.7 These people commonly engage in unlawful activities that extend to the killing and torture of innocent civilians, thus depriving innocent civilians of these Convention rights.

Article 1 of the Convention provides that Member States must secure these rights and freedoms to everyone within their jurisdiction. This means that Member States must take measures to ensure that no individual is subjected to torture nor to inhuman or degrading treatment, whether committed by a public official or by private individuals such as terrorists.8 Similarly, Members must also take “preventive operational measures” to protect individuals whose lives are at risk from the acts of other individuals, such as terrorists.9

These are positive obligations placed on Member States and public officials to ensure that innocent civilians are not killed or tortured by anyone, including terrorists.10 They require Member States to take reasonable measures to prevent the killing11 or torture12 of anyone in cases where authorities had or ought to have had, at the material time, knowledge of a “real and immediate risk” of loss of life or torture.

However, these positive obligations are in addition to negative obligations placed on Member States not to kill or torture individuals within their jurisdiction, whether innocent civilian or terrorist.13

III. RESTRICTIONS ON NON-JUDICIALLY SANCTIONED STATE ACTIONS

A. Deprivation of Life

Article 2(2) of the Convention provides exceptions where a Member State is permitted to use force that might result in the deprivation of life.14 Under Article 2(2)(a), such force may be used “in the defence of any person from unlawful violence”. Such force must also have been “absolutely necessary” in order to achieve the aim in Article 2(2)(a)15 and must therefore be “strictly proportionate”.16

As Articles 2 and 3 are fundamental and basic values of Member States,17 the ECtHR subjects deprivations of life to careful scrutiny and will therefore consider both the actions of state agents who administer the force as well as surrounding circumstances such as the planning and control of the operation.18

The restriction on public officials using such force only when absolutely necessary is itself an uncontroversial restriction. An example demonstrating this necessity is the case of the innocent civilian who was shot dead by police officers on 22 July 2005 on board the London transport network because the public authorities had wrongly suspected that he was a terrorist.19 Although the civil case was settled by mediation,20 this case illustrates the need to hold public officials accountable for their counter-terrorism operations.

In most cases, the application of the test of “absolute necessity” (and its accompanying strict proportionality test) will be straightforward. The firing of guns directly at demonstrators21 and usage of high-explosive indiscriminate aerial fragmentation bombs in an area populated with innocent civilians are clearly more than absolutely necessary.22 However, in less straightforward cases, the manner of application of the test to the facts might result in a decision that places an unreasonable restriction on public officials, especially when applying strict proportionality.

In McCann v United Kingdom,23 4 soldiers shot dead 3 known terrorists in Gibraltar24 after they made movements that appeared as if they were attempting to detonate a bomb.25 It transpired that the terrorists were not armed and were only on a reconnaissance mission with the intention of eventually planting a bomb there.26 The ECtHR held that by not making sufficient allowances for the possibility that intelligence information could be wrong and by not preventing the terrorists from travelling into Gibraltar, the overall situation led to the killing of the terrorists which was therefore not absolutely necessary, violating Article 2.27 This controversial decision generated a strong political backlash in the UK against the ECtHR.28

It is submitted, in support of the minority judges, that the failure to make allowances for intelligence information being wrong was analysed by the majority judges with the benefit of hindsight.29 Both the majority30 and minority31 judges agreed that the authorities had incomplete information and had no choice but to formulate their operation on the basis of information available at that time. Difficult operational choices had to be made involving unpredictable human conduct.32 It must be recalled that the actions taken by the UK government must be judged based on the information available at the material time,33 a position that is akin to the approach under UK Domestic Criminal Law.34

Judges in the majority had earlier found that since the soldiers honestly believed, based on the information that they had, that shooting the suspects was necessary to prevent serious loss of life. The soldiers thus did not violate Article 2: “to hold otherwise would be to impose an unrealistic burden on the State and its law-enforcement personnel in the execution of their duty, perhaps to the detriment of their lives and those of others”.35 This stands in stark contrast against the subsequent finding that the UK Government violated Article 2, especially since the latter had also honestly believed, based on the information they had, that shooting those terrorists were absolutely necessary to save the lives of innocent civilians.

The consequences of the intelligence information being correct are devastating and as such no responsible government would have allowed the risk of such a detonation.36 It is therefore submitted that the authorities were correct in proceeding on the worst-case scenario basis.37 Failing to do so would show a “reckless failure of concern for public safety”38 and a breach of the authorities’ duty to protect innocent civilians as well as their own military personnel.39

It is also submitted, in support of the minority judges, that it would not have been practicable for UK authorities to arrest and detain the terrorists at the border.40 The UK Government’s reason for not arresting the terrorists at the border was because there was insufficient evidence to warrant the detention and trial of the suspects.41 However, this was rejected by the majority.42 The result of the majority’s finding places an unreasonable restriction on public authorities because arresting and releasing terrorists at that stage in time would have alerted the terrorists to the readiness of the authorities.43 The risk of a successful renewed attack on innocent civilians would increase as a consequence.44 Furthermore, the UK Government had no option of preventive detention of suspected terrorists as the ECtHR had previously ruled that detention without trial would be a violation of Article 5 of the Convention.45 The incompatibility of preventive detention with the Convention, even in the context of terrorism, has subsequently been reinforced.46

As such, the ECtHR’s imposition of a test of strict proportionality in determining whether the force was “absolutely necessary” effectively leaves the UK government without any options to protect innocent civilians from terrorists. On the facts of McCann v United Kingdom, there would have been nothing the UK government could have done and they would have been forced to risk innocent lives.

By way of contrast, on the opposite end of the spectrum, the USA frequently engages in targeted killings of terrorists via drones and airstrikes, even on targets located in foreign countries.47 This itself is submitted to be too extreme an opposing view.

It is submitted that a middle ground should be adopted where the proportionality test is moderated to be more lenient, in line with general standards relating to private- or self-defence. Under UK Domestic Criminal Law, strict proportionality is not applied for these doctrines of defence because it is unrealistic to expect anyone to weigh the exact amount of force necessary for self-defence in the midst of a situation.48 This position is similar elsewhere because the proportionality of a response should not be weighed on “golden scales” with the “luxury of time and calmness to think about the possible courses of action to take”.49 The detached objectivity that is natural in courtrooms long after the incident has taken place is an inappropriate test for such proportionality.50

B. Torture, inhuman or degrading treatment

(1) Obtaining Information

Torture as well as inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment are widely accepted to be morally wrong and unacceptable behaviour. The issue here is whether there are circumstances where such behaviour can ever be justifiable. Much of this discourse tenders to moral and philosophical quandaries as opposed to legal matters. It is therefore unsurprising that there is no international consensus on this issue. As much academic ink has been spilled on this issue – most of it being non-legal and beyond the scope of this article – the following will only provide a brief overview of the contrasting positions at the risk of oversimplification.

Deontologists favour an absolute moral prohibition because of the essence of human dignity which prevents such actions, regardless of any possible disastrous costs of an absolute prohibition.51 A common illustration is to let a nuclear bomb go off in a city rather than getting the information needed to stop it.52 The Council of Europe and the ECtHR both adopt positions in favour of the deontologist view. The prohibition against torture, and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment is an absolute prohibition.53 This is irrespective of the conduct of the person,54 and has no exceptions and can have no derogations, “even in the event of a public emergency threatening the life of the nation”.55 Even under difficult circumstances such as fighting organized terrorism and crime, violations of Article 3 are absolutely prohibited.56 Furthermore, a sufficiently real and immediate threat of conduct violating Article 3 may also result in a violation of Article 3.57 In addition, any physical force that has not been made strictly necessary by a suspect’s conduct may result in a violation of Article 3.58 In light of the absolute nature of the Article 3 right, judicial corporal punishment such as caning has also been ruled to violate Article 3, and therefore cannot be applied to any person59 regardless of the crime committed.60

Under this view, one must also consider the possibility of suspects confessing false information to stop being tortured. Furthermore, suspects may not always possess the information as believed and may not even be the correct persons to apprehend.61 Furthermore, opening the door to “some” torture might lead to a slippery slope as it is not possible to limit the boundary on torture, leading to more extensive torture.62 Lastly, torture is more heinous than operational killings because a suspect is particularly vulnerable when held in police custody and deprived of liberty.63 Where the suspect is already entirely under the public authorities’ control, the authorities must bear a duty to protect him or her.64

Consequentialists, on the other hand, acknowledge that there may be some circumstances where torture may be necessary for the greater good.65 An example of the consequentialist view is the USA which engages in conduct that would violate Article 3 of the Convention during some of its interrogations.66

Under this view, a common example is known as the “ticking bomb” scenario where information is needed urgently to diffuse a bomb to save lives and torture is the only method that can obtain the information.67 In such situations, at varying levels, consequentialists agree that torture would be necessary.68 Beyond this common argument, it should be noted that in one case where the interrogation was held in breach of Article 3, the authorities obtained a “considerable quantity of intelligence information, including the identification” of 700 terrorists and solved 85 unexplained crimes.69

(2) Obtaining Convictions

Where subsequent evidence is obtained as a result of information earlier obtained during treatment that violates Article 3 (torture, inhuman or degrading treatment), and if the evidence (resulting in a conviction) is a direct result of the violation, then it is automatically unfair to use the evidence.70 The reason for this is because allowing such evidence to be admitted would be an incentive for public authorities to continue violations.71. This only applies where the evidence had a bearing on a conviction, as opposed to reliance on other untainted evidence.72 This means that the focus of the ECtHR is on the unfairness of the violation in light of the absolute nature of Article 3, as opposed to other factors in other jurisdictions such as reliability,73 probative value74 or voluntariness.75

While hardly any objection is taken to this approach, caution must be taken by the ECtHR to ensure that conduct in alleged violation actually meets the high thresholds of “torture, inhuman or degrading” treatment. The reason for this is because in interrogations, “some discomfort has to be expected”76 and it should be borne in mind that “the police work in difficult circumstances” such that removing “all doubt of influence or fear” would mean that the police “would never be able to achieve anything”.77

IV. RESTIRCTIONS ON JUDICIALLY SANCTIONED STATE ACTIONS

The ECtHR has decided that Member States cannot extradite a criminal to a Non-Member State where there are substantial grounds to believe that there is a real risk of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment for the criminal.78 In light of the fact that judicial corporal punishment such as caning has been held to be prohibited by Article 3,79 Member States are unable to extradite terrorists to Non-Member States to face caning. The ECtHR subsequently extended this to include the death penalty and execution,80 such that Member States can no longer extradite criminals to Non-Member States to face the death penalty.81 The ECtHR has also expanded this to include extradition to a Non-Member State where a terrorist faces a de facto irreducible life sentence without parole.82 The ECtHR has made clear that these restrictions also prevent expulsions83 and even to the deportation of illegal immigrants that have snuck into the country.84 In one case where extradition was prohibited, the ECtHR has went so far as to say that the “serious threat to the community” does not diminish the risk of a terrorist suffering harm when deported.85

Leaving aside any potential diminution of deterrent effect from death penalties or caning, the implication of the ECtHR’s decisions is that Member States are no longer able to get rid of terrorists that were originally not within their jurisdiction. Furthermore, an extension of this would be that terrorists from Non-Member States might specially flee to seek refuge in Member States since they cannot be deported back to face the death penalty or judicial corporal punishment even if they entered the Member State illegally.

A possible workaround in recent times has been to ensure that the state requesting for extradition agrees not to impose judicial corporal punishment on the suspect.86 This can logically be extended to securing an agreement not to impose the death penalty as well. It remains, however, less than ideal. Apart from questions of sovereign equality or those of imposing of subjective values on other states, any Non-Member State is free to decide that it will not agree to the imposed terms for extradition, thus leaving the Member State potentially stuck with a terrorist. Furthermore, the ECtHR may not even be persuaded by the assurances provided by the state requesting for extradition if it finds that the foreign government is unable to adequately guarantee a freedom from Article 3 treatment.87

V. CONCLUSION

The sum effect of developments in the ECtHR’s case law is that governments and public officials in the Council of Europe are severely hampered from combating terrorism. Member States must fulfil a test of strict proportionality when making decisions relating to deprivations of life and are also unable to detain nor remove terrorists from their countries. These considerable restrictions place the lives of innocent civilians at significant risk and are therefore unreasonable in the context of fighting terrorism.

It is suggested that in analysing state behaviour in respect of terrorism, a useful analogy may be drawn from the opposing goals and values of Criminal Justice Systems. In the Criminal Justice System, a balance is normally struck somewhere along the spectrum between a model that primarily aims to suppress crime88 (the “Crime Control Model”) and a model that primarily seeks to protect an individual’s rights89 (the “Due Process Model”). When it comes to terrorism, many innocent lives are at stake. The severity of the risks involved mean that the appropriate balance required must be shifted towards the values of the Crime Control Model. It is thus submitted that the better way forward is to focus on suppressing terrorism, with the necessary compromise on some of the values of the Due Process Model. As such, primacy must be given to the protection of innocent lives with the necessary evil of watering down some of the rights in the Convention.


[1] Council of Europe, Statute of the Council of Europe, CETS No. 001 (1949) at Article 26 (as at May 2018).

[2] Ibid at Articles 3 and 8.

[3] Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, CETS No. 005 (1950), as amended by Protocols No. 11 and 14.

[4] Ibid at Article 19.

[5] Ibid at Article 46.

[6] Soering v United Kingdom [1989] ECHR 14 at [102].

[7] The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English, 9th Ed, sub verbo, “terrorist”.

[8] Z v United Kingdom [2001] ECHR 333 at [73]; A v United Kingdom [1998] ECHR 85 at [22].

[9] Osman v United Kingdom [1998] ECHR 101 at [115].

[10] Ibid.

[11] Ibid at [116]; See also, Edwards v United Kingdom [2002] ECHR 303 at [121].

[12] Z v United Kingdom [2001] ECHR 333 at [73].

[13] Supra note 9 at [115].

[14] McCann v United Kingdom [1995] ECHR 31 at [148].

[15] Ibid.

[16] Ibid at [149].

[17] Ibid at [147].

[18] Ibid at [150].

[19] Armani Da Silva v United Kingdom [2016] ECHR 314, at [12] and [37]–[38].

[20] Ibid at [142].

[21] Simsek v Turkey [2005] ECHR 546 at [108] and [112].

[22] Kerimova v Russia [2011] ECHR 744 at [253] and [257].

[23] Supra note 14.

[24] Ibid at [199].

[25] Ibid at [196] and [197].

[26] Ibid at [219].

[27] Ibid at [213].

[28] Peter Cumper, “When the State Kills – McCann and Others v United Kingdom”, (1995) 4 Nottingham LJ 207.

[29] Joint Dissenting Opinion, McCann v United Kingdom, [1995] ECHR 31 at [8].

[30] Supra note 14 at [193].

[31] Supra note 29 at [8]

[32] Supra note 9 at [116].

[33] Ibid; see also Edwards v United Kingdom, [2002] ECHR 303 at [121].

[34] Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 (UK), c4, s76(3).

[35] Supra note 14 at [200].

[36] Supra note 29 at [9].

[37] Ibid at [13].

[38] Ibid.

[39] Supra note 14 at [192].

[40] Supra note 29 at [11].

[41] Supra note 15 at [204].

[42] Ibid at [205].

[43] Supra note 29 at [11].

[44] Ibid.

[45] Brogan v United Kingdom [1988] ECHR 24.

[46] A and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56; A and Others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] ECHR 301.

[47] Philip Alston, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions”, (2010) United Nations, A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 at [18]-[22].

[48] Supra note 34 at s76(7)(a); Palmer v R [1971] AC 814 (Privy Council on Appeal from Jamaica).

[49] PP v Vijayakumar s/o Veeriah [2005] SGHC 221 at [52].

[50] Jai Dev v State of Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 612 (India) at 617.

[51] Robert J Homant et. al., ‘Is Torture Ever Justified – College Students’ Attitudes Toward Coercion/Torture’ (2008) 8 JIJIS at p 153.

[52] Ibid at p 153.

[53] Supra note 12 at [73]; Republic of Ireland v United Kingdom [1978] ECHR 1 at [163].

[54] Republic of Ireland v United Kingdom [1978] ECHR 1 at [163].

[55] Aksoy v Turkey [1996] ECHR 68 at [62]; Selcuk & Asker v Turkey [1998] ECHR 36 at [75].

[56] Ibid.

[57] Gafgen v Germany [2010] ECHR 759 at [91].

[58] Bouyid v Belgium [2015] ECHR 819 at [100].

[59] Tyrer v United Kingdom [1978] ECHR 2 at [35].

[60] Ibid at [34].

[61] Supra note 51 at p 154.

[62] Ibid.

[63] Ribitsch v Austria [1995] ECHR 55 at [36] and [38]; Bouyid v Belgium [2015] ECHR 819 at [100].

[64] Bouyid v Belgium [2015] ECHR 819 at [103] and [107].

[65] Supra note 51 at p 154.

[66] Department of Defense Joint Task Force 170 on Guantanamo Bay in Cuba, APO AE 09860, Declassified “Legal Brief on Proposed Counter-Resistance Strategies”, JTF170-SJA (31 October 2002).

[67] Supra note 51 at p 153.

[68] Ibid at p 154.

[69] Supra note 54 at [98].

[70] Ibid at [173]; Gocmen v Turkey [2006] ECHR 2003.

[71] Supra note 54 at [178].

[72] Ibid at [178]-[181] and [187].

[73] Poh Kay Keong v PP [1995] 3 SLR(R) 887 (Court of Appeal, Singapore) at [42].

[74] Muhammad bin Kadar v PP [2011] SGCA 32 at [53].

[75] Yeo See How v PP [1996] 2 SLR(R) 277 (Court of Appeal, Singapore) at [40].

[76] Ibid.

[77] Panya Martmontree v PP [1995] 2 SLR(R) 806 (Court of Appeal, Singapore) at [29].

[78] Supra note 6 at [91] and [111].

[79] Supra note 59 at [35].

[80] Al-Saadoon & Mufdhi v United Kingdom [2010] ECHR 282 at [120] and [137].

[81] AL (XW) v Russia [2015] ECHR 964 at [64].

[82] Trabelsi v Belgium [2014] ECHR 893 at [138] and [139].

[83] LM v Russia [2015] ECHR 908 at [126].

[84] Jabari v Turkey [2010] ECHR 369 at [42].

[85] Saadi v Italy [2008] ECHR 179.

[86] John Geddie and Robert Birsel (ed), “Singapore says won’t cane suspected bank robber if deported from UK”, (20 February 2018) Reuters World News, online: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-singapore-bank-robbery/singapore-says-wont-cane-suspected-bank-robber-if-deported-from-uk-idUSKCN1G40Y9>; “StanChart robbery: Singapore agrees to UK request to not cane suspect if found guilty”, (20 February 2018) Channel News Asia, online: <https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/singapore/stanchart-robbery-singapore-david-roach-uk-request-extradition-9974270>.

[87] Chahal v The United Kingdom [1996] ECHR 54 at [105].

[88] Herbert L Packer, The Limits of the Criminal (1968) Stanford University Press at p 159.

[89] Ibid at p 239.


The Disclosure of Medical Risks in Singapore and the case of Montgomery

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The Disclosure of Medical Risks in Singapore and the case of Montgomery

Keith Jieren Thirumaran

INTRODUCTION

There are three main areas that doctors engage in when practicing medicine: diagnosis, treatment and advice. In order for doctors to avoid negligence liability, they must meet the applicable standard of care expected of them. However, in the context of advice with respect to disclosure of risks, the test for determining whether a doctor is in breach of the applicable standard of care has attracted a considerable amount of attention. Singapore has retained the traditional doctor-centric test, but several overseas jurisdictions have since developed more patient-focused approaches – notably, the recent UK Supreme Court decision of Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [Montgomery].1 This article will examine the various tests used by courts both locally and overseas, after which it will be submitted that the status quo in Singapore should be maintained in light of compelling local circumstances.

TESTS USED LOCALLY AND OVERSEAS

The Singapore position pre-Montgomery

The current position in Singapore is embodied in the Court of Appeal case of Dr Khoo James & Anor v Gunapathy d/o Muniandy [Gunapathy]2 where the Court applied the Bolam-Bolitho test to the disclosure of risks in the medical context.

The Bolam-Bolitho test is the locus classicus for the standard of care required of doctors and comprises of two separate tests. The plaintiff must show that a doctor defendant has failed either of these tests in order to establish a breach of the standard of care.

The Bolam test, formulated in Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee,3 requires a doctor to have acted in accordance with a practice accepted as proper by a responsible body of medical men skilled in that particular art. This means that a doctor will not be found negligent as long as part of the medical profession agrees with what the doctor did, even if there is a body of opinion that takes the contrary view,4 and even if the court prefers one of the views over the other.5

The Bolitho test, formulated in Bolitho v City & Hackney Health Authority,6 is a threshold test of logic and consistency when accepting the opinion of medical peers. This comprises two stages: the expert must have directed his mind to the comparative risks and benefits of the matter; and the opinion must be a defensible conclusion, meaning that it must be internally consistent and should not ignore known medical facts.7

The main reasons the Court of Appeal in Gunapathy cited for applying the Bolam-Bolitho test was that judicial wisdom has its limits. A judge unskilled in medicine has no business adjudicating matters which medical experts themselves cannot agree on.8 Furthermore, excessive judicial interference would hamper the proper development of medical science, give rise to defensive medicine, and lead to higher medical costs and wastage of medical resources. 9

The development of the “prudent patient” approach

In the UK case of Sidaway v Bethlem Royal Hospital Governors [Sidaway],10 Lord Scarman in his dissent suggested moving from the Bolam-Bolitho approach toward a “prudent patient” test similar to that found in the American case of Canterbury v Spence.11 In the Australian case of Rogers v Whitaker [Rogers],12 the High Court favoured Lord Scarman’s dissent13 and decided the case on the basis of what risks a “prudent patient” would wish to know, save for the exception of therapeutic privilege cases. The Canadian Supreme Court case of Reibl v Hughes14 and the Malaysian Federal Court case of Foo Fio Na v Dr Soo Fook Mun & Anor15 have also taken similar approaches to the disclosure of risks in the medical context.

In the UK itself, the majority decision in Sidaway is no longer good law. The case has since been effectively overruled by the recent Supreme Court decision of Montgomery.16 The Montgomery approach17 is that a doctor must disclose risks that a reasonable person in the patient’s position would attach significance to, as well as risks that the doctor should reasonably be aware that the actual patient would attach significance to. The patient need not question the doctor,18 though the doctor must engage in a proper dialogue with the patient to ensure that the latter is aware of and understands the risks.19

There are three exceptions to the above test where a doctor does not have to disclose the relevant risks.20 The first is when the patient does not wish to know any further information.21 The second is the therapeutic privilege exception which allows a doctor to withhold information from the patient if the doctor reasonably considers that its disclosure would be seriously detrimental to the patient’s health. 22. The third is in circumstances of necessity such as when treatment is required urgently but the patient is unconscious or otherwise unable to make a decision.23

Whether the risk is considered material enough to be disclosed depends on various factors such as magnitude of risk, nature of risk, effect of its occurrence upon the life of the patient, importance to patient of the benefits from treatment, alternative treatments and risks of those alternative treatments (“Montgomery Factors”).24

Singapore’s stance on the “prudent patient approach”

Although the Singapore High Court acknowledged Montgomery in the cases of Thong Jiang Andrew v Yue Wai Mun & Anor 25 and Hii Chii Kok v Ooi Peng Jin London Lucien and another,26 it left the question of which test should apply open (Bolam-Bolitho or Montgomery). Nonetheless, on the existing facts, it seems that the Singapore Courts favour the Bolam-Bolitho test.

Firstly, the Court of Appeal in Gunapathy, in the context of advice and disclosure of risks, did not find favour with Lord Scarman’s dissent in Sidaway, the foundations for the prudent patient approach as discussed above. Instead, the Court in Gunapathy preferred to follow the majority in Sidaway in applying the Bolam-Bolitho test to the context of advice and disclosure of risks.27

Secondly, the Court in Gunapathy also noted that Lord Bridge’s qualification in Sidaway (that if there was a substantial risk and no cogent clinical reason for non-disclosure, a Judge can conclude that no respectable medical expert would have failed to disclose that risk) was already subsumed under the Bolitho test and was therefore unnecessary.28

Thirdly, Chief Justice Sundaresh Menon, in his address at the Opening of the Legal Year 2016, has also emphasised the importance of preventing doctors from practicing defensive medicine.29 The Learned Chief Justice also promoted the use of alternative dispute resolution such as mediation, as opposed to litigation, for resolving medical disputes.30 This is further evidence of the importance of reducing medical litigation in Singapore, which is more in line with the Bolam-Bolitho test. The Montgomery test, on the other hand, may subject doctors to greater legal liability.

COMMENTARY ON THE FUTURE POSITION IN SINGAPORE

Since the position in the UK (which Singapore was following) has been changed by the case of Montgomery, the Singapore Court of Appeal will have to consider this and other international developments to determine which test should apply in Singapore. While some may be quick to cast their vote for a change to Montgomery, this author believes that Singapore should stick to its current position and uphold the Bolam-Bolitho test.

Underlying policy considerations in support of the Bolam-Bolitho test

Policy reasons form the basis for sticking to the Bolam-Bolitho test, in particular, hampering the proper development of medical science, giving rise to defensive medicine, higher medical costs and wastage of medical resources.31 As Chief Justice Menon pointed out in his address, a fear of litigation would distort medical practice and raise insurance costs.32 These are fundamental policy considerations that underpin the Bolam-Bolitho test and they are still as strong today.

At first glance, it would appear that the learned Chief Justice’s concerns were already considered by the Supreme Court in Montgomery. The Supreme Court in that case disagreed that there was a possibility of increased litigation and defensive medicine from its approach. Furthermore, the Court opined that its approach would result in patients being aware that the outcome of treatment is uncertain, and that its approach allows patients to take responsibility for the ultimate choice of undergoing that treatment.33 This, in the Court’s opinion, would therefore lower the likelihood of litigation in the event of an adverse outcome.34

However, this author respectfully disagrees with the views expressed in Montgomery. While it may be thought that less litigation would directly translate into less defensive practices, this is not necessarily true. The very fact that doctors under the Montgomery approach have to disclose more risks is itself a defensive practice which would lead to higher costs. Doctors would never be sure where to draw the line, and would “play safe” by disclosing many, if not all, the risks associated with the treatment.

In Montgomery, the Court failed to take into account the increased medical costs involved with their approach.35 The defensive medical practice of disclosing more risks of treatment (in order to avoid liability for failing to disclose a risk) would lead to “higher medical costs and wastage of precious medical resources”.36 More time will be needed to disclose and explain risks, which could have been spent treating another person or saving a life (which the Court in Montgomery did not discuss). Time wastage may be exacerbated where a patient who has been notified of many new risks is inclined to further question the doctor for explanations, elaborations, and evaluations on them, regardless of the significance of the risk. The Montgomery approach may raise medical costs, going against the aims that the learned Chief Justice and the Court in Gunapathy had sought to achieve.

Furthermore, even with the therapeutic privilege exception, disclosing every conceivable risk to a patient that is not “at-risk” can still cause unbalanced decisions and frighten the patient.37 A patient may opt for a more expensive treatment or refuse otherwise viable treatment when frightened by an insignificant risk. It is therefore submitted that in order to avoid higher medical costs and wastage of resources, the decision of which risks are significant enough to the patient and need to be disclosed should best be left to the judgment of the medical profession.

Lastly, the Court in Montgomery felt that imposing legal obligations was necessary to force doctors to engage in a discussion with their patients. However, as Baroness Hale said in Gregg v Scott,38 doctors are motivated by their natural desire and professional duty to do their best for their patients. It is this author’s opinion that a doctor would therefore engage in the discussion with their patients, even without legal obligations, as long as the doctor feels that it would be in the patient’s interest to know of a particular risk.

Montgomery’s human rights focus is inapplicable to Singapore

The decisions in the UK, such as Montgomery, may not be applicable in Singapore. This is because, as stated by the Singapore High Court, the UK decisions may have been influenced by the UK’s emphasis on human rights and autonomy.39 This emphasis on human rights and autonomy in the UK may be attributed to the European Convention of Human Rights [ECHR],40 enforced under the Human Rights Act [HRA].41

However, neither the ECHR nor the HRA is binding on Singapore Courts.42 Therefore, in the absence of any rights-based legislation, the Singapore Courts may not be inclined to adopt an approach, such as Montgomery, which is based on a strong emphasis of Human Rights.43

Bolam-Bolitho and Montgomery tests likely to reach the same conclusion

The Bolam-Bolitho test would, in this author’s opinion, already encompass the bulk of the Montgomery approach. It is submitted that the large majority of risks disclosed under the Montgomery approach would already be disclosed under the Bolam-Bolitho test, ultimately giving rise to same legal conclusions.

Firstly, if a doctor is aware that his patient would attach significance to a particular risk, then in the absence of cogent medical reasons such as the therapeutic privilege exception, there appears to be no reason why that doctor would not disclose that risk to the patient. Therefore, it appears that any reasonable doctor would disclose risks that he is aware his patient finds significant, thereby satisfying the Bolam test, while also satisfying the Montgomery test.

Secondly, even in the absence of any cognisance of specific significance to his patient, a doctor would disclose risks that the doctor believes should be disclosed. A doctor is likely to take into account the various Montgomery Factors listed above (save for “importance to patient of the benefits from treatment”) when making an assessment of what to disclose to a patient. Therefore, save for the internal thoughts of a patient, a reasonably doctor who satisfies the Bolam test by considering the Montgomery Factors would satisfy the Montgomery test and disclose all material risks.

Furthermore, in Singapore the minimum that the Bolam test requires a reasonable doctor to do would be to adhere to the Singapore Medical Council’s Ethical Code and Ethical Guidelines [Ethical Code].44 The Ethical Code requires doctors to keep a patient “adequately informed” of his treatment options so that “he is able to participate in decisions about his treatment”.45 The Ethical Code also requires doctors to “provide adequate information” so that a patient can make “informed choices”.46 As the wording is notably broad, it is highly probable that a doctor which satisfies the provision of “adequate information” under the Bolam test is likely to have disclosed all material risks and thereby satisfy the Montgomery test.

Thirdly, there is no risk of the medical profession exploiting the Bolam-Bolitho test. This is because if the responsible body of medical men would not have disclosed the risk, and if this is not founded on a logical basis, the Bolitho test would then step in.47 The Bolitho test is not an invasive inquiry into the merits of the medical opinion before the Court.48 However, if the medical profession illogically omits to warn of certain risks which patients should undoubtedly be informed of, the Court should interfere on the authority of Bolitho.49 This is especially so when the disclosure of that particular risk was so obviously necessary in order for the patient to make an informed choice.50 An example provided by the Court was if the risk is substantial, of grave consequences and there is no cogent clinical reason for omitting to disclose the risk.51 Therefore the Bolitho test will help to catch risks that should be disclosed under Montgomery but where the medical profession as a whole would not have done so.

The Montgomery test is impractical

Even with the practical similarities highlighted above, it is acknowledged there are a handful of risks that a prudent patient would want disclosed that a reasonable body of medical men would not have disclosed. This handful of risks would be caught by the Montgomery approach but would not have been caught under the Bolam-Bolitho test. The existence of these risks stem from the main difference between the Bolam-Bolitho test and the Montgomery approach: the perspective from which the test is applied.

It is submitted that the Montgomery test provides a very artificial guideline to follow and it would not be realistic to expect a doctor to adhere to such a test. While it is acknowledged that a doctor can attempt to think from the perspective of a reasonable patient, and thereby theoretically be able to cover some of the material risks from a patient’s perspective, the reality is that a doctor cannot tell with any precision or certainty what a reasonable patient would wish to know. Therefore, in their bid to escape liability under the Montgomery test, a doctor would practice defensive medicine by simply disclosing every conceivable risk. This is undesirable as it would lead to the aforementioned higher medical costs and wastage of medical resources.

Therefore, applying the Montgomery approach only gives the appearance of human rights and autonomy. Instead, the Montgomery approach would lead to more prevalent defensive practices as well as unnecessarily cause a greater number of doctors to be found negligent merely due to the unrealistic expectation of predicting what a prudent patient would want to know.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the Singapore Courts should not feel pressured to accept the approaches adopted in other jurisdictions but should choose the approach that is most desirable to the Singapore context and society. It may well be that maintaining the status quo could be the better approach for Singapore.


[1] Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board, [2015] UKSC 11.

[2] Dr Khoo James & Anor v Gunapathy d/o Muniandy, [2002] 2 SLR 414.

[3] Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee, [1957] 1 WLR 582 at 587.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Maynard v West Midlands Regional Health Authority, [1985] 1 All ER 635.

[6] Bolitho v City & Hackney Health Authority, [1998] AC 232 at 241-242.

[7] Supra note 2 at [64] – [65].

[8] Supra note 2 at [144].

[9] Ibid.

[10] Sidaway v Bethlem Royal Hospital Governors, [1985] AC 871.

[11] Canterbury v Spence, (1972) 464 F 2d 772.

[12] Rogers v Whitaker, (1992) 175 CLR 479.

[13] Ibid at [10].

[14] Reibl v Hughes, (1980) 114 DLR (3d).

[15] Foo Fio Na v Dr Soo Fook Mun & Anor, [2007] 1 MLJ 593.

[16] Supra note 1.

[17] Supra note 1 at [87].

[18] Supra note 1at [58].

[19] Supra note 1 at [90].

[20] Supra note 1 at [85] and [88].

[21] Supra note 1 at [85].

[22] Supra note 1 at [88].

[23] Supra note 1 at [88].

[24] Supra note 1 at [89].

[25] Thong Jiang Andrew v Yue Wai Mun & Anor, [2015] SGHC 119 at [36] – [37].

[26] Hii Chii Kok v Ooi Peng Jin London Lucien and another, [2016] SGHC 21.

[27] Supra note 2 at [142].

[28] Supra note 2 at [141].

[29] Chief Justice Sundaresh Menon: Response at the Opening of the Legal Year 2016 (11 January 2016), online: <http://www.supremecourt.gov.sg/Data/Editor/Documents/Response%20by%
20CJ%20%20Opening%20of%20the%20Legal%20Year%202016%20on%2011%20January%202016%20(Checked%20against%20Delivery%20110116).pdf> at [43].

[30] Ibid.

[31] Supra note 2 at [144].

[32] Ibid.

[33] Supra note 1 at [93].

[34] Ibid.

[35] It is suggested that the UK’s National Health Service may have been a contributing factor that would have downplayed the concern of patients’ medical costs for the Court in Montgomery.

[36] Supra note 2 at [144].

[37] Tong Seok May Joanne v Yau Hok Man Gordon, [2012] SGHC 252 at [76].

[38] Gregg v Scott [2005] UKHL 2 at [217].

[39] D’Conceicao Jeanie Doris (administratrix of the estate of Milakov Steven, deceased) v Tong Ming Chuan [D’Conceicao], [2011] SGHC 193 at [123]; Tong Seok May Joanne v Yau Hok Man Gordon [2012] SGHC 252 at [64] and [172].

[40] Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 4 November 1950, 213 UNTS 221 (entered into force 3 September 1953)

[41] Human Rights Act 1998 (UK), c 42.

[42] Supra note 38.

[43] Ibid.

[44] Singapore Medical Council, Ethical Code and Ethical Guidelines, online: <http://www.healthprofessionals.gov.sg/content/dam/hprof/smc/docs/guidelines/SMC%20Ethical%20Code%20and%20Ethical%20Guidelines.pdf>.

[45] Ibid at 4.2.2.

[46] Ibid at 4.2.4.

[47] Supra note 2 at [141].

[48] D’Conceicao at [40].

[49] Ibid at [124].

[50] Supra note 10 at 900.

[51] Ibid.